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ABSTRACT In the wake of the rejection of the Nice Treaty by the electorate in June
2001, the Irish government moved to establish a National Forum on Europe, which
was to be the arena for a new socially inclusive and highly visible dialogue on issues
arising out of Irish membership of the European Union (EU). The Forum represented
an entirely novel approach to consideration of European affairs in Ireland and, as
such, an acknowledgement that the old era of ‘permissive consensus’ on EU issues
had gone. This article utilises insights from deliberative democracy to analyse the new
Irish discourse on Europe that the Forum has helped articulate. The analysis suggests
that the Forum has successfully widened the scope and substance of Irish attitudes
to Europe. Most importantly, it has helped shift the emphasis from functional cost-
benefit considerations related to receipts from the CAP and structural funding, to more
broad-based and ‘mainstream’ consideration, which encompass the broad ambit of
issues connected to the future direction of the European integration project. The arti-
cle also argues that the Forum has engaged a wider and more inclusive group of soci-
etal actors in European debate. Thus, Irish EU debate is no longer concentrated
among traditional elites — the political parties, trade unions, business groups and
academics. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which the Forum has encour-
aged greater popular participation in EU debate.
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Introduction
Modelled on the New Ireland Forum (NIF) and its successor, the Forum for
Peace and Reconciliation, and emerging as one element of the response to the
rejection by the electorate of the Nice Treaty in June 2001, the National
Forum on Europe (NFOE) was set up with the aim of encouraging the widest
possible societal dialogue on Europe in Ireland. The objective set out by its
Chairman at its launch was to “undertake a wide-ranging analysis of what
the European Union has meant to Ireland, to examine issues concerned with
the historic enlargement now in prospect, and to inform the Government,
through debate, as to how the Irish people — those at the centre of the debate
— see the future development of Europe in a way which will suit Irish inter-
ests”.1 This encompassed a number of key objectives: to bridge the gap
between political elites and the citizens of the Republic on European issues;
to make ‘Europe’ more intelligible to the public; to make the EU more visible
within national political debate; and to address concerns regarding enlarge-
ment and Ireland’s future in an enlarged Union. Whilst some saw the Forum
as a short-term and cynical measure on the part of a government which had
for the first time lost a European referendum and needed to be seen to be
doing something in response, others welcomed the prospect of a comprehen-
sive and spirited national conversation on Europe.
This article analyses the work of the Forum from the perspective of popu-
lar participation and deliberative democracy. It seeks to examine the contri-
butions and arguments put forward by the participants, to analyse the issues
that most preoccupied the members, to investigate the proceedings of the
public sessions of the Forum, and to weigh up the extent to which the Forum
really contributed to re-constituting European debate in Ireland on a more
inclusive basis. It begins by examining Ireland’s changing relationship with
the European Union, the dramatic impact of the failure of the Nice Treaty
referendum in 2001 and the context in which the Forum was established.
Ireland and Europe: Nice as Watershed
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which the result of the 2001 referen-
dum represented a seismic shock to the body politic in Ireland. The country
which, in opinion polls such as Eurobarometer, consistently produced the
highest levels of support for European integration and, which more than any
other member state, had made the EU work for it, now performed a volte
face in rejecting the Nice Treaty. Despite the support of all four major polit-
ical parties, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats,
as well as the support of the business community, the trade unions and most
civil society groups, the electorate failed to endorse the Treaty.2
Whilst supporters of the Treaty picked over the bones of a failed
campaign, some argued that it represented the cumulation of a growing anti-
European feeling in Ireland, which had been evident from the earliest days of
membership. After all, opposition to the integration project, tracked through
the referendums held over the years, showed an increase in the No vote from
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17 per cent in 1972 to 30 per cent in 1987 (Single European Act), to 31
per cent in 1992 (Treaty on European Union), to 38 per cent in 1998
(Amsterdam Treaty), culminating in a decisive winning majority of 54 per
cent in the Nice referendum of 2001.3
Although government strategy had to address the concerns of the elector-
ate, it was clear from a very early stage that a second referendum was on the
cards. The pressure for ratification emanating from the EU and the Candi-
date States made that plain enough. For the government it was clear that
some new form of public consultation and dialogue would be desirable as a
response to the decision of the electorate and as a proactive move to establish
the case for carrying the Treaty in a second referendum. The original idea of
establishing a Forum, however, came from the opposition Labour party in
December 2000, before the date of the referendum on the Nice Treaty had
been set. In part this represented the party leadership’s response to internal
party criticism of the Nice Treaty, but it was also a proposal predicated on a
negative appraisal of the modus operandi of the Referendum Commission
which, because of a ruling in a landmark Supreme Court judgement, would
be tasked with the responsibility of giving equal coverage to both sides of the
argument in the upcoming referendum on the Treaty.4 In the case of an
earlier referendum on abortion this had led to great confusion among voters.
The Labour party argued that a wide-ranging and transparent dialogue on
the full range of issues related to Irish membership of the EU would contrib-
ute to helping citizens better understand the issues and re-structure Ireland’s
European conversation on a more mature level.5 In the aftermath of the fail-
ure of the referendum in June 2001 the government accepted the proposal to
institute a Forum and was quickly supported by all of the other political
parties with the exception of main opposition party Fine Gael.6
The New Ireland Forum as a Model
The government’s task of putting the new deliberative structure in place
was rendered somewhat easier by the existence of a domestic template. This
was the New Ireland Forum from the 1980s. The brainchild of then
Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald and SDLP leader John Hume, the New Ireland
Forum was designed to “examine in a radical way the future development
of all the people of the island”.7 The four main constitutional nationalist
parties on the island, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the SDLP partici-
pated in the Forum. Unionist parties refused to attend, but some individual
unionists presented their viewpoints.8 The New Ireland Forum Report was
published on 28 May 1984 and was nothing if not radical in its findings,
arguing that if a new Ireland was to emerge it could only do so via a new
constitutional compact, one which would genuinely embrace all traditions
on the island.
There are two important respects in which the New Ireland Forum stands
as a model for the National Forum on Europe. The first is in the way it
sought to lay out the facts about Northern Ireland in a comprehensive way
that transcended party politics and ideological positions. The deliberations
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were characterised by a firm effort to ‘face reality’, with the issues laid out in
clear and stark fashion. In the aftermath of the rejection of the Treaty of
Nice, the National Forum on Europe would strive similarly to lay out all the
facts relating to Irish membership of the EU in a structured format and in a
relatively non-partisan climate.
A second parallel can be found in the preoccupation of both the New
Ireland Forum and the National Forum on Europe with the concept of iden-
tity. Where the New Ireland Forum “set out on a conscious search for an
Irish identity that would simultaneously embrace and transcend the conflict-
ing identities of unionism and nationalism”,9 the Forum on Europe sought to
understand Ireland’s EU membership in the context of overlapping Irish and
European identities. The New Ireland Forum brought together, for the first
time since the division of Ireland in 1920, “elected representatives from
North and South to deliberate on the shape of a new Ireland in which people
of differing identities would live together in peace and harmony”.10 The
National Forum on Europe, in its deliberations, would grapple with the new
duality of Irish identity, the new context that European membership brought
to the old questions of identity and political community in Ireland.11 With
the progressive deepening of the European Union and Irish interaction with
the broad range of actors and institutions within the new transnational co-
operative arenas, the ‘Europeanisation’ of Ireland and the ‘socialisation’ of
Ireland into modern (or perhaps post-modern) European structures meant
that identity would be to the fore of the Forum’s deliberations.12
Deliberative Democracy
The work of the Forum, its modes of deliberation and development, pose
interesting questions about the way in which EU politics is played out in indi-
vidual member states. There is thus a need to analytically embed the Forum
and its work in concepts of governance, collective decision making and
models of representation and participation. Is there evidence that the Forum
has contributed to the ‘Europeanisation’ of public policy in Ireland? Should
the Forum be understood as a traditional elite-centred deliberative body or a
genuine vehicle for citizen participation in EU affairs? This article argues that
the Forum has enhanced both the range and scope of elite debate on EU
issues whilst modestly encouraging an important measure of popular partic-
ipation. This dualism is best understood under the rubric of deliberative
democracy.
Under deliberative democracy, according to Dryzek “the essence of demo-
cratic legitimacy should be sought in the ability of all individuals subject to
a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that deci-
sion”.13 The important point here is that of ‘continuous’ or ‘processual’
democracy. Individuals are not just content with exercising their right to vote
every few years; large numbers of people now assert the right to scrutinise
and hold to account governments and political elites through continuous
political activity, which, as Magnette argues, “combine electoral rights with
new kinds of patterns of participatory politics”.14 These patterns can be
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highly differentiated, both universal and particular, ranging from cyberspace
‘town hall’ meetings to more traditional mid-term elections, to popular refer-
endums and citizen initiatives and, as in California in 2003, a so-called ‘recall
election’. Other such patterns can be located in associative and interest group
activity, broader collective movements such as the anti-globalisation move-
ment and web-based discussion and deliberative fora.15 The common
denominator that links these new participatory patterns is not just the poten-
tial they offer for empowering citizens vis-à-vis elites. It is that individuals
should accept the decisions of elite bodies only if they can be publicly justi-
fied in very convincing terms.16
The “deliberative turn” in political science springs from “a renewed
concern with the authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic
control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by competent citi-
zens”.17 Although even early classical scholars of democracy considered
some forms of broad societal deliberation necessary and useful, what distin-
guishes current forms of deliberative democracy is the emphasis placed upon
the necessity of equal and effective opportunity to participate in processes of
collective judgment;18 what Nentwich terms “political opportunity struc-
tures” for citizens.19 This requires moving towards a much broader concep-
tion of the ownership over political decisions. Uhr argues that theories of
deliberative democracy go beyond earlier approaches to participatory
democracy “by specifying in greater detail the nature of the deliberative
process in which citizens should be able to participate and of the importance
of institutions of civil society to an effective deliberative process”.20 The
focus on ideals of public deliberation reflects the ambition of deliberative
democrats to ground political decision-making “in norms of shared public
reason”. In addition, the very process of deliberation is one that holds out
the possibility of preference change. In other words, the process of delibera-
tion can and does result in actors changing their initial policy preferences in
response to the arguments deployed in the discursive arena.
Encouraging Popular Participation?
The ‘deliberative turn’ can only be fully understood by engagement with
models of popular participation in and oversight of public decisions. Delib-
eration can only remain rhetorical and superficial without meaningful popu-
lar engagement with political issues and processes of decision making.
Benjamin R. Barber defines participatory politics as dealing with “public
disputes and conflicts of interest by subjecting them to a never-ending
process of deliberation, decision, and then action”.21 The benefits for society
of the greatest level of popular participation are taken for granted, as public
ends are “literally forged through the act of public participation, created
through common deliberation and common action”. Participatory democ-
racy strives for consensus, but it accepts the inevitability of conflict. The key
to conflict resolution is the reconstruction of private or partial interests into
publicly defensible norms through sustained deliberation. Barber is in agree-
ment with deliberative democrats in arguing that the substantive meaning
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and content of political issues can and does change shape and direction when
subjected to participatory processes.
In Western industrial democracies the social compact is built and depen-
dent for its survival upon meaningful popular participation in political life.
Barber argues “community grows out of participation and at the same time
makes participation possible; civic activity educates citizens even as citizen-
ship informs civic activity with the required sense of justice. Politics becomes
its own university, citizenship its own training ground, and participation its
own tutor”.22 Citizens, thus, should “not only be given the opportunity to
participate, but also be encouraged to do so … civic participation has become
the cornerstone of mass democracies”.23
In reconciling the fact of relatively low popular participation rates with the
fact of adequately functioning democracies, political scientists have enlarged
their understanding of the political process and of the role of the average citi-
zen in that process. The role of the citizen has evolved into something differ-
ent from that envisaged by classical democratic theorists such as John Locke
or John Stuart Mill. From a limited, narrowly-defined conception of society,
and thus citizenship and expectations regarding participation (who may
participate and what sort of channels are to be used), modern society has
evolved a very differentiated and complex division of labour, not only in the
economic sector but also in politics and government. Political roles have
become highly disaggregated and specialised in what are now called gover-
nance systems. At the same time, participation has become far more diffuse.
Michael Nentwich, in contributing to the debate on the EU’s much
discussed ‘democratic deficit’, points out that across the EU “only indirect,
non-binding and largely informal channels for the participation of citizens
have been put in place so far”.24 This is because citizens were only belatedly
brought in to the process (with direct elections in 1979 introducing direct
representation for the first time) and thus have not been at the centre of the
European political system (understood here as a recognisable and unified
polity) for the greater part of its history.
For Nentwich this means that what he terms the POS (Political Opportu-
nity Structure) of the EU does not know any element of direct democracy in
the narrow sense.25 Apart from elections to the European Parliament every
five years, there are no direct ways for citizens to participate in European
politics. The citizens therefore do not have an opportunity to play a direct
role in agenda setting or to directly influence collective outcomes. Nowhere
can be found a direct arena where questioning of representatives by citizens
is possible. In addition given that EP elections are seen as ‘second order elec-
tions’ in many member states, voting as a mechanism for direct participation
does not hold the same attraction as does voting in national elections. Only
Denmark and Ireland consistently ratify EU treaties through popular refer-
endums. This is a central element of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’, which
it is alleged the EU suffers from.
Although the concept of a ‘democratic deficit’ is itself one that has been
challenged by academics26 and public representatives, EU officials have, in
recent years, conceded the substantive point regarding perception (if not
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reality). There have been many efforts made by the EU to ‘bring in the citi-
zens’ i.e. encourage meaningful popular participation in the EU policy-
making process. Most recently the White Paper on European governance
defined participation as one of the five major principles of ‘good gover-
nance’. Participation is supposed to enhance both the efficiency and legiti-
macy of European governance. Greater legitimacy in particular would flow
from citizen participation of a more substantive kind. In Ireland the National
Forum on Europe sought to encourage enhanced participation through two
important mechanisms: public meetings where citizens could directly ques-
tion public representatives, and secondly, through accepting and debating
submissions from citizens and interest groups. For the first time this included
a substantive online participatory process. Both deserve analysis under the
rubric of deliberative democracy. Whilst these mechanisms augmented the
structured deliberation among the political parties and civil society groups in
the plenary sessions, they also contributed to an enhancement of popular
participation in EU debate.
Bringing in the Citizens: Public Meetings 
The idea of going on the road, of bringing the Forum to a local level, was that
of the Chairman, Senator Maurice Hayes: “the idea of going around the
country is a direct transplant of my experience of working in Northern
Ireland, especially on the Patten Commission on policing. We did that in the
north and the public were glad we did it and people were very receptive to
it”.27 His aim was “to provide a neutral space to enable people to hear all
sides of the argument on Europe and to have their say, in their own areas”.28
The public meetings were organised around separate themes. The policy
areas and issues of concern that arose in the plenary sessions were largely
confirmed and, indeed, reinforced in the course of the series of mini-fora. The
four key issues to emerge were: issues of sovereignty and Irish neutrality;
concerns about legitimacy, transparency and accountability of the EU
system; the balance between large and small member states within an
expanding Union; and the governance of the EU. The institution of these
public meetings meant that, for the first time since joining the then EEC in
1973, Irish people had a dedicated and structured arena for expressing their
concerns at a local level about the nature of Irish membership of the EU, and
for impressing on public representatives the nature of their concerns.
The success of the public meetings might be gauged in a number of ways,
chiefly the numbers of people attending, local media coverage, and success in
engaging people in the Forum’s work. The mini-fora did indeed generate
substantial coverage in local and regional media. Editions of a weekly syndi-
cated radio programme on the Forum’s work were taken by up to seven
stations, while a commissioned TV programme went out widely on the NTL
cable television station in the greater Dublin area. The number of hits on the
Forum website progressively increased to one thousand per week.29 Not
unnaturally, the public meetings held in the run up to the second Nice Treaty
referendum in October 2002 attracted the greatest number of citizens. At
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some venues in excess of 300 people turned up to listen to the arguments and
put their points of view to the public representatives.30
The Chairman’s promise to ensure that the Forum would constitute a
‘listening shop’ and not a ‘talking shop’ meant that the bulk of each meeting
was given over to citizen concerns rather than political polemics from public
representatives and interest groups. Thus, it could be argued that, through
the public meetings in particular, the Forum represented a valuable exercise
in encouraging meaningful and substantive popular participation in EU
affairs. It may have represented a small step, but nevertheless was a signifi-
cant break with the elite-centred conversation that had previously dominated
discussion of the EU in Ireland. This part of the Forum’s activities may well
constitute a blueprint for the future — referendums on EU affairs will surely
see a form of structured public dialogue centred on informing and engaging
people through public meetings and information campaigns.
There was also something of a ‘demonstration effect’ in that the success
enjoyed by the ‘roadshow’ demonstrated to politicians the value of ‘going
local’ with European issues. Thus the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) Commit-
tee on European Affairs sought to emulate the Forum by taking some of its
meetings to regional venues. At the first regional meeting of the Committee
in Mayo in early 2003 there was clearly a nod to the Forum as the Committee
hosted a seminar with three local schools before embarking on its ‘normal’
business. Members of the Committee, convinced of the importance of publi-
cising its work and legitimating its oversight and scrutiny functions, have
declared their intention to hold Committee meetings in different parts of the
country on a regular basis. The level of civic engagement demonstrated at the
public meetings held by the Forum is consistently cited as evidence for the
participatory potential of such mechanisms and an argument for a move
away from the traditional elite-centred deliberative structures.31
Submissions
The second important mechanism for enhancing popular participation in the
debate, but one also focused on elite deliberation, was the submission
process. The Forum invited submissions from individual citizens, political
parties, individual politicians, civil society groups, business organisations,
trade unions, church organisations and the European Union institutions. On
foot of an open invitation at the end of October 2001, over 60 submissions
were received by the deadline of 1 December.32 Subsequently, submissions
for oral presentation were selected by the Forum’s steering committee. The
two main subjects of interest were the Nice Treaty and its imperfections and
EU enlargement.
The submissions ranged from the very detailed such as those on enlarge-
ment from Forfás33 and IBEC34, to the specific such as that from the Adelaide
Hospital Society on EU health policies and the Irish Esperanto Society’s plea
that Esperanto be recognised as an official EU language. Individual citizens
tended to comment on their interpretations of the Nice Treaty and what this
meant for Ireland. Academic contributions focused mainly on ‘big-picture’
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themes such as EU security policy and enlargement. The social partners
focused, intentionally, on the areas of interest to them but also submitted
views on enlargement and the merits of the Nice Treaty. The nature and
concerns of the submissions certainly influenced the agenda of the Forum.35
The flow of submissions perhaps understandably slowed considerably
after the Yes vote in October 2002. The Forum secretariat posted electronic
submissions onto its website and thus established a sort of ‘virtual Forum’, a
framework for receiving inputs from political circles and civil society and
engaging the wider public with the substantive issues. This brought the
public deeper into the ongoing dialogue in that those who could not attend
plenary and regional meetings could at least get a sense of the main strands
of debate by accessing the submissions. Thus, whilst it would be foolish to
exaggerate the potential impact of the internet, in the case of the Forum it
can be said to have made a modest positive contribution to enhancing popu-
lar participation and mobilisation in EU debate in Ireland.
The Forum as an Elite Deliberative Body
Some would argue that the Forum’s work should be read cynically, as an
attempt by the pro-European side to share the blame for the first Nice refer-
endum defeat, as a cosmetic instrument designed to give the impression of
‘listening’ to the people, and as a panicked reaction to the breakdown of the
‘permissive consensus’ that had governed Irish attitudes to Europe since
accession. That argument is undermined, however, by three observations.
First, those on the Eurosceptic side readily embraced the Forum as a vehi-
cle for presenting their concerns about the direction of the European integra-
tion process. Had there existed some sort of conspiracy to ensure an
overwhelmingly positive endorsement of Ireland’s relationship with the EU
and a Yes vote in the second referendum, the Eurosceptic political parties and
civil society groups would almost certainly not have participated in the
Forum. Ironically, it was Fine Gael, traditionally identified as the party most
enthusiastic about EU membership, which alone decided to stay out. That
decision, as has been seen, would later be reversed. Second, these groups have
admitted that they were very fairly treated by the Chairman with respect to
contribution times and the exchange of views, and that the Forum did consti-
tute a genuine attempt to institute a far-reaching dialogue on Europe that had
been absent through all the years of Irish membership of the EC/EU.36
Finally, and most crucially, the government’s decision to maintain the Forum
as a vehicle for EU debate — after the second referendum had seen the Nice
Treaty carried — again suggests a genuine commitment to reconstituting
European debate in Ireland on a more permanent footing.
If one disregards the cynical interpretations of the Forum a more nuanced
set of observations can be produced. The analytical framework provided by
deliberative democracy suggests a number of important ways in which the
work of the Forum can be viewed as a departure from traditional Irish fora
for public policy debate and in particular dialogue on Irish engagement with
the European Union. In the first place the Forum contributed to collective
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decision making through a sustained and fully transparent elite and popular
process of deliberation on the full range of issues surrounding Ireland’s EU
membership. Arguably the problem-solving capacity of the polity has
improved somewhat in this area as a result. As deliberative democrats would
suggest, it has introduced an element of ‘processual’ or continuous democ-
racy that marks a distinct change from the previous norms of periodic or
issue-specific dialogue centred on referendums, elections, or individual polit-
ical controversies. The continuity of debate on European public policy is
arguably, helping to underpin Ireland’s changing relationship with the EU as
it moves from the status of narrowly focused Cohesion state to a member
state with a much wider concept of self-interest.
Second, the Forum’s deliberations took place in a policy space largely inde-
pendent of the coercive influence of government and the hitherto dominant
pro-European lobby. For the first time in European debate in Ireland, the
pro-Europeans found themselves opposed in a structured setting by an
equally strong and vociferous set of actors. It could be argued that, over the
years, with obvious economic benefits being derived from membership of
the EU, the political establishment’s perception of the Irish relationship with
the EU became dangerously unbalanced and left little room for dissident
opinion. The rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001 changed all this.
Suddenly opposition to the EU was open, visible, and respectable. The Forum
provided opponents of European integration an important public arena in
which to legitimise themselves and their arguments, and to present them-
selves as equals of the pro-Europeans. In helping to problematise the concept
of ‘integration’ itself opponents of the integration project also helped develop
a more sophisticated Irish debate on Europe, by focusing especially on the
non-economic dimensions of membership. The Forum thus constituted a
valuable public space in which an alternative conception of Irish EU member-
ship could be advanced and articulated.
Third, the institution and development of the Forum has helped to consid-
erably widen the range of elite and civil society actors contributing to
European debate. Earlier in this article comparison was made with the New
Ireland Forum of the 1980s as a template for the Forum on Europe. The
twenty-seven members and fourteen alternate members of that body
consisted solely of party politicians. The National Forum on Europe, in
contrast, embraced all the political parties in the Republic, the Irish MEPs,
and, through its Special Observer Pillar, a much broader cross section of civil
society, with organisations like the social partners, groups active in the Nice
referendum campaigns and European affairs more generally, and the major
churches and faiths. The inclusion of these groups reflects their new promi-
nence in the Irish national debate on Europe, which has accelerated over the
past decade.37 Also there as observers were registered political parties not
represented in the Oireachtas38 and parties from Northern Ireland.
The wider dialogue made possible by the inclusion of the Special Observer
Pillar was generally acknowledged. Ciaran Toland of Ireland for Europe, for
example, asserted that the Forum Chairman, Senator Maurice Hayes “has
increasingly looked beyond the political parties to the civil society groups like
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ourselves and sectoral groups, such as the churches and the Youth Council,
for input. In particular the submission process for oral and written submis-
sions was extremely positive, and provoked real engagement”.39 This more
inclusive concept of political and social dialogue is one that persuades some
that the Forum managed to engender a more substantive sense of ownership
over the intra-EU policy process that Ireland is part of. This accords with a
core concept of deliberative democracy, that the health of the polity is
substantially improved with the ability of civil society groups to articulate,
aggregate and represent their own interests.
One notable development arising out of the Forum was the enhanced
public profile attained by some of the smaller (and newer) political parties in
Ireland. The dynamism exhibited by both Sinn Fein and the Green Party
during the first referendum campaign stood in marked contrast to the
complacency and sheer inertia of the pro-European parties. And, although
they were ultimately to lose the argument on the Nice referendum, both
parties used the Forum to their advantage by ‘blooding’ some of their
prospective parliamentary candidates in the heat of political debate, and by
building for these candidates a media profile that was put to good use in the
general election campaign of 2002.40 In addition, both parties were very
prominent at the regional meetings of the Forum, with a local presence that
sometimes dwarfed that of the more established political parties.
Arguably, the Forum also changed the nature of elite thinking and
discourse on Irish membership of the EU. The structure and development of
the Irish political system and political culture historically militated against
public representatives thinking about, engaging with and really ‘internalising
Europe’, except in the most functional cost-benefit sense. Larry Siedentop in
Democracy in Europe castigates European elites for making the “public case
for Europe almost exclusively in economic terms. In their pronouncements,
the elites of Europe have fallen victims to the tyranny of economic language
at the expense of political values such as the dispersal of power and
democratic accountability. Increasingly, we find ourselves worshipping at
the altar of economic growth rather than citizenship”.41 In the Irish case,
however, a number of features of the political culture have long exacerbated
the problem.
The most important of these has been the ingrained parochialism and
extravagant clientelism which, for many observers, has been the significant
distinguishing characteristic of Irish politics.42 The structure of the system
did not encourage public representatives to think seriously about European
issues in any sustained way. The nature of the multi-seat proportional repre-
sentation electoral system (PRSTV) in particular militated against the Dáil
developing as a strong Parliamentary Chamber; as Joe Lee suggests it has
“exerted a paralytic influence on many politicians”.43
As a consequence of the PRSTV system and the competitive nature of
intra-party competition within individual constituencies which it encour-
aged, public representatives have traditionally been exclusively concerned
with ‘delivering for the locality’ and watching their backs against local party
rivals; the obvious consequence of this is that for too long politicians have
182 John O’Brennan
been oblivious to European and international politics. The so-called ‘dual
mandate’, which allowed public representatives to simultaneously hold the
offices of member of parliament and member of the local county council, also
contributed to an excessive focus on constituency issues, to the neglect of EU
issues, save for issues surrounding the delivery of the structural or cohesion
goodies.
There is strong evidence to suggest that the Forum has helped to counter
these tendencies by providing a sustained public debate on EU issues that has
informed public representatives and brought ‘Europe’ into the mainstream of
Irish political debate for the first time. From the outset the Forum’s discourse
has been embedded in a pan-European narrative. With speakers from France,
Slovenia, Malta, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the UK, Belgium, Sweden,
Austria and Poland, as well as members of the European Commission and
the President of the European Parliament, the Forum also impressed on
participants the extent to which Ireland’s future is interlinked with its neigh-
bours and partners in Europe. Thus a sense of ‘networked Europe’ and ‘part-
nership Europe’ was communicated consistently to the Forum members and
observers. Those with isolationist and nationalist tendencies were confronted
with evidence of the importance of the multifaceted and well-developed rela-
tionships which have grown up around the EU. Thus the Forum, through its
various modes of deliberation, has contributed further to the Europeanisa-
tion of Irish public policy.
Similarly the Forum contributed to an enriched understanding of what the
enlargement process entails. With testimony from a large number of senior
politicians and scholars from the Candidate countries, the Forum contrib-
uted to better informing the political classes about the nature of the transfor-
mation process in Central and Eastern Europe, the difficulties faced in
meeting the criteria laid down in the acquis communautaire, and the atti-
tudes and disposition of potential future allies within the EU family.44 The
sheer number of plenary sessions dedicated to enlargement issues is indica-
tive of the importance attached by the Forum to informing political and
societal actors about the different dynamics of the enlargement process.
A fourth important observation is that the Forum’s participative instru-
ments have also functioned as a mechanism for achieving some sort of
balance between consensus and cleavage on European issues in Ireland. In
this sense it accords with the emancipatory prescriptions of Almond and
Verba.45 Agreement on the larger principles which, it is argued, govern
Ireland’s relationship with the European Union, even if they are somewhat
vague and normative, have helped to bridge the cleavages which emerged
during the first Nice Treaty referendum. The Forum as an instrument of
bridge building in effect has facilitated movement toward consensus. This is
not to overstate the importance of the Forum’s work. It is, however, to argue
that it can be credited with some important achievements. The Forum
undoubtedly helped to ease tensions between the pro and anti Nice sides in
the wake of the rejection of the Treaty in 2001. By providing an arena for
structured dialogue in which a healthy exchange of views could take place,
the Forum helped ensure that the fissures created by Nice I were not further
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exacerbated. The sharp polarisation revealed by Nice I continued to exist but
the edges were blunted somewhat.
Finally, it should be noted that the Forum also made an impact with EU
officials and those interested in finding mechanisms for bridging the demo-
cratic deficit, for bringing Europe ‘closer to the citizen’ in the future. Close
attention was paid to its deliberations by think thanks such as the Centre for
European Reform and the European Policy Centre. It may even serve as a
model that is taken up by other European states as they grapple with similar
issues in managing their relations with the EU. Polish Foreign Affairs Minis-
ter Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz told the Forum that “just over a month ago we
established in Poland our own Forum on the future of Europe, which func-
tions in a similar formula to yours. The Polish Forum meets in various places
around the country to discuss the future of Europe with the public at
large”.46 The importance of the signals sent out by the Forum to the Candi-
date countries was underlined by the Chairman in his Second Report on the
Forum’s work: “the frequent presence of a large number of the Diplomatic
Corps, including notably ambassadors from Candidate countries, ensured
that the voice of the Forum was heard beyond Irish shores”.47
The Forum as a Vehicle for Popular Participation
If the evidence suggests that the Forum has contributed significantly to a
reconfiguration of elite debate in Ireland on European issues, a much more
modest impact on popular participation can be evinced. The argument
presented here suggests that the Forum did not really meet the expectations
of those who hoped for meaningful popular participation. Whilst one could
argue that the institution of the Forum helped in forging a more participative
culture in Ireland, and complemented other measures such as the re-consti-
tution of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs in a strength-
ened capacity48 (designed to ensure greater oversight of EU legislation), it is
debatable whether ordinary citizens responded in any significant way. Whilst
turnout in the second Nice referendum increased significantly, by a factor of
one third, from 35 per cent to 49 per cent (a very significant factor in the
outcome given that almost all of these ‘returning’ voters voted to accept the
Treaty), a turnout figure short of 50 per cent hardly represents an indication
of an engaged citizenry and robust participation. Certainly, the turnout
figure compares very poorly to those witnessed in Denmark on European
referendums there over the past decade49.
If one moves away from the ‘pure’ concept of participation and modifies
it to embrace the idea of giving people a clearer sense of ownership over the
political process, then the Forum can be credited with some successes. If the
argument is about a greater visibility for Europe and EU related issues and
bridging the ‘information gap’ then the Forum must be viewed more posi-
tively. Professor Richard Sinnott’s analysis of the 2001 referendum showed
that a mere 8 per cent of people felt they had a good understanding of what
the Treaty was about and a further 28 per cent that they understood some of
the issues but not all those involved. This meant that effectively two thirds of
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the electorate admitted to not understanding the Treaty.50 Thus addressing
the information deficit became a crucial plank of Government strategy.
The Forum represented one important part of that strategy. Citizens who
spoke at the public meetings acknowledged that the government had at least
paid attention to concerns and the Forum represented one important mech-
anism for disseminating information and encouraging debate. Professor
Sinnott’s report on the second referendum confirmed that the Government’s
information campaign, which was far superior to that during the first refer-
endum, “struck a chord with a substantial number of voters”.51 In the first
campaign, 44 per cent of voters claimed they did not vote because they
lacked understanding of and information on, the Treaty. Just 26 per cent
gave the same excuse after the second referendum. The crucial point here is
that the Forum itself emerges rather well from Sinnott’s analysis. Nearly
25 per cent of respondents found its work valuable, while nearly 50 per cent
were at least aware of its work. That said, however, “just 8 per cent of people
believe they know appreciably more about the European Union itself”.52 The
importance of keeping people informed was underlined by former Labour
party leader Ruraí Quinn: “it demonstrates the need for a sustained informa-
tion campaign throughout all the institutions of the State on an ongoing basis
about Europe”.53
Lawrence Pratchett points out that there is nothing new about popular
participation in politics as a supplement to the traditional forms of represen-
tative democracy.54 However, he argues that recent years have seen the intro-
duction of a range of more innovative participatory instruments and these
have begun to change the nature and impact of popular participation. Insofar
as these new patterns of participation contribute to the opening up of poli-
tics, democratic practice is enhanced. The National Forum on Europe repre-
sents at least a step in the right direction in Ireland, and offers the potential
for empowering citizens to a much greater degree in the years ahead.
Conclusions
The arguments presented here regarding the impact of the National Forum
on Europe can only be understood in the context of Ireland’s changing rela-
tionship with Brussels. The economic renaissance that has changed the face
of the country over the past decade has also altered the contours of debate
on the nature and merits of EU membership. The rejection of the Nice Treaty
in 2001 made manifest the new concerns regarding sovereignty, institutional
issues and the future trajectory of the European integration process. With the
failure of the referendum the Irish government moved to tackle these
concerns by instituting a new public arena for dialogue and deliberation. The
Forum represented an entirely novel approach to consideration of European
affairs in Ireland, and as such, an acknowledgement that the old era of
‘permissive consensus’ on EU issues had gone.
The evidence suggests that the Forum has successfully widened the scope
and substance of Irish elite attitudes to Europe. Most importantly, it has
helped shift the emphasis from functional cost-benefit considerations related
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to receipts from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural fund-
ing to a more broad-based and sophisticated analysis. It has succeeded in that
by engaging a wider and more inclusive group of societal actors in European
debate and, to a lesser extent, by creating structures that have facilitated
limited popular participation in its deliberations. On that basis one can
certainly claim that the Forum represents a small but not insignificant
advance in the democratic oversight (both elite and popular) of EU issues in
Ireland, and perhaps a model for other member states in their efforts to
widen the scope of domestic participation in EU affairs.
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